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Abstract
We conducted an experiment with middle and high school students to test the
external validity of a common laboratory measure of cheating. Subjects performed
several coin tosses and earned money depending on the outcomes they reported.
Because the coin tosses were not monitored, subjects faced a nancial incentive to
misreport their outcomes without having to worry about getting caught. We linked
the responses from the lab experiment with three measures of school misconduct
(i.e., disruptiveness in class, failure to complete homework, and absenteeism). The
ndings show that cheating in the lab signicantly predicts misbehavior in school,
suggesting that the experimental measure of cheating generalizes qualitatively to
naturally occurring environments.
JEL classication: C93, K42
Keywords: Cheating, Honesty, Experiment, External Validity, School Misbehavior.
 Cohn: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL
60637, U.S., email: alain.cohn(at)chicagobooth.edu. Maréchal: University of Zurich, Department of
Economics, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland, email: michel.marechal(at)econ.uzh.ch.
We thank Jonas Addor and Joël Farronato for excellent research assistance and David Tannenbaum and
John List for helpful comments. Financial support from the Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute is gratefully
acknowledged. Correspondence to: Cohn and Maréchal.
1 Introduction
Cheating, misconduct and other forms of rule violating behavior are pervasive problems
in many important areas of social and economic life. Examples range from scandals in
the business world (e.g., Volkswagen's recent emission fraud or interest and exchange
rate manipulations in the nancial industry) to rigged sport competitions (Duggan et al.
2002), rampant corruption in developing countries (Pande and Olken 2012; Banerjee
et al. 2013), and student and teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003; Levitt and Lin
2015).
Given the prevalence and cost of dishonesty to society, a rapidly growing literature
on behavioral ethics has emerged with the aim to provide a better understanding of the
determinants of lying, cheating, and stealing (see Ariely 2012; Irlenbusch and Villeval
2015, and Shalvi et al. 2015 for recent reviews). Due to its clandestine nature, dishonest
behavior is typically dicult to measure reliably using observational eld data (Zitzewitz
2012). As a consequence, the majority of empirical ndings originates from controlled
laboratory environments.1
A widely used experimental paradigm to measure cheating is to instruct subjects to
perform a simple task of chance (e.g., ipping coins or rolling dice) and asking them to
report their outcomes. Because the actual outcomes are not observed by the experimenter
and only certain outcomes are rewarded, subjects face the temptation to increase their
earnings by misreporting their outcomes without any risk of getting caught (e.g., Bucciol
and Piovesan 2011; Shalvi et al. 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Cohn et al.
2014; Abeler et al. 2014).2 Although cheating cannot be detected at the individual
level, researchers can measure cheating at the group level as the true distribution of the
underlying random process is known. Moreover, because higher earnings are less likely
1See Pierce and Balasubramanian (2015) for a survey of the literature on dishonest behavior that
uses observational data and eld experiments.
2Another common approach are interactive sender-receiver games where senders can increase their
earnings by sending deceptive messages to the receiver (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Sutter 2009).
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to be the result of chance, earnings claimed by individual subjects can serve as a proxy
for their cheating behavior. While this paradigm has been used extensively to study the
determinants of dishonesty, the extent to which the insights gained from the lab can be
extrapolated to naturally occurring environments remains unclear. Common objections
to the generalizability of lab experiments are that subjects make low-stakes decisions in
articial environments and thatthey know their behavior is being recorded and analyzed
(Levitt and List 2007; Falk and Heckman 2009).
In this paper we investigate whether cheating in the lab predicts rule violating be-
havior in the eld. To this end, we matched a common laboratory measure of cheating
with teacher evaluations of students' misbehavior in school. We experimentally measured
cheating by asking the students to toss ten coins in private and report their outcomes.
Students only received nancial rewards when reporting heads, and thus had a nancial
incentive to misreport their outcomes for unsuccessful coin ips. Our measures of school
misbehavior are based on the US National Education Longitudinal Survey. Specically,
we asked teachers to assess their students along three dimensions: disruptiveness in class,
non-completion of homework, and absenteeism. These measures of school misconduct are
important as they have been shown to reliably predict future educational achievement
and labor market outcomes (Segal 2013).3
We found a positive and signicant correlation between the laboratory measure of
cheating and students' misbehavior in school. The dierence in school misbehavior be-
tween a student who reported a successful coin toss on every single trial and a student
who reported a successful outcome in 50 percent of the cases is the same as between two
students with a dierence in cognitive ability of 2.7 standard deviations. The relation-
ship between the laboratory measure of cheating and school misbehavior remains strong
after adding controls for age, gender, nationality, school level, and parental education.
3Disruptive and noncompliant behavior in school also seem to matter for students' current academic
performance as we found negative and signicant correlations between students' self-reported grade point
average (GPA) and the three measures of school misbehavior (disruptiveness: p = 0:001, homework:
p < 0:001, absenteeism: p = 0:002, Spearman tests).
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Moreover, we found that behavior in the coin tossing task explains about one-fth of
the gender gap in school misbehavior. Together, these results suggest that the cheating
paradigm from the lab provides an externally valid measure of rule violating behavior in
the eld.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, a growing number
of studies combines lab and eld data from the same subjects to examine the external
validity of laboratory measures of behavior.4 For example, Karlan (2005) found that
second-mover behavior in a trust game correlates with the likelihood of loan repayment
among participants of a microcredit program in Peru.5 Using experimental measures of
present bias, Sutter et al. (2013) show that more impatient children and adolescents are
more likely to buy alcohol and cigarettes, are more likely to be obese, and are less likely to
save money.6 Our ndings suggest that cheating in the lab provides a reliable indicator of
rule violating behavior in the eld. Two other studies analyzed the relationship between
rule violation in the lab and the eld, but they both used rather unusual participants
drawn from the extreme ends of the honesty distribution. Hanna and Wang (2014)
examined cheating in a sample of government nurses in India. They found that nurses
who cheated more in a dice task also tended to show up at work less often. Cohn et al.
(2015b) conducted a coin tossing experiment with inmates from a maximum-security
prison. They found a positive correlation between claimed earnings from the coin tosses
and misconduct in prison (e.g., illegal drug possession or aggression against guards and
other inmates). It is reassuring that these two papers arrive at the same conclusion as
our study despite using dierent methods and subject pools.7
4See Camerer (2015) for an overview of experimental studies linking behavior in the lab and eld.
5Benz and Meier (2008); Carpenter and Myers (2010); Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011); Burks et al.
(2015), and Cohn et al. (2015a) provide further evidence for positive associations between lab and eld
measures of prosociality.
6Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that experimentally elicited present bias is a reliable predictor of
credit card borrowing.
7Dai et al. (2015) recently presented the results from a dice-rolling experiment with public transport
passengers and showed that the proportion of fully dishonest participants is higher among those who
did not hold a valid ticket. List (2009) analyzed a subsample of 17 sellers from open air markets for
which he observed lab and eld behavior. He found that sellers who breached collusive agreements in
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Second, our paper also speaks to a growing literature on the causes and consequences
of school misconduct. For example, Segal (2013) shows that students misbehaving in
eighth grade are almost three times less likely to nish high school and have almost 10
percent lower earnings as adults relative to non-disruptive students. Bertrand and Pan
(2013) found that behavioral problems in school are more prevalent among boys, espe-
cially if they grow up in single-mother households. This nding may explain the widening
gender gap in academic achievement in the United States and other developed countries
(Goldin et al. 2006; Becker et al. 2010; Fortin et al. 2015). While school misconduct might
aect labor market success through its negative impact on academic achievement (e.g.,
due to impaired learning), our ndings suggest an additional, complementary channel,
namely decits in social and behavioral skills that are increasingly valued by employers
(Deming 2015). Our paper therefore also links to an emerging literature on the role of
behavioral or noncognitive skills in explaining educational achievement, labor market
success, and other important adult outcomes (e.g., Bowles et al. 2001; Heckman et al.
2006, 2013; Campbell et al. 2014).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the details
of the experimental design. Section 3 discusses the results of the experiment and section
4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Design
We conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment with 162 students from eight classes in two
Swiss public schoolsone middle and one high school. Students were between 12 and
20 years old, and 43 percent of them were female. They were informed that their data
will be treated condentially. Although participation was voluntary, all students gave
their consent to participate in the study. We ran the experiment simultaneously in all
four classes at each school to avoid cross-talk between subjects. The experiment took
contextualized lab experiments were also more likely to do so in the eld.
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place in the classrooms in absence of the teachers. We set up a mobile laboratory and
installed partition walls to shield subjects from sight and therefore ensure privacy.
In the rst part of the experiment, we asked subjects some basic socio-demographic
questions including age, gender, nationality, and parental education. In part two, we
measured their cognitive ability using two short tests from Dohmen et al. (2010): the word
uency test and the symbol-digit correspondence test.8 Both tests are related to working
memory and processing speed, which is often part of the reason children thrive or struggle
in school, but they measure distinct concepts of reasoning capability (Carroll 1993).9
The word uency test measures crystallized intelligence (ability to solve problems using
knowledge and experience) by asking subjects to list as many dierent animals as possible
within 90 seconds. Subjects received one point for each correct and unique animal named.
The symbol-digit correspondence test measures uid intelligence (innate ability to solve
problems) and consists of decoding sets of unfamiliar symbols into single digits as fast as
possible within 90 seconds. For each set, subjects had to write down the correct numbers
under a grid of nine symbols using a predened mapping between symbols and digits.
Subjects earned one point for each correct symbol-digit pair.
The last part of the experiment comprised the coin tossing taskour laboratory
measure of cheating. Subjects rst opened an envelope containing ten coins, each worth
0.5 Swiss francs (about US $0.55). Then, they were instructed to toss each coin in private
and report their outcomes on paper. For every coin toss for which subjects reported the
outcome heads they were allowed to keep the coin; they had to put the coin back
into the envelope otherwise. Participants thus faced a nancial incentive to cheat by
misreporting the outcomes of their coin ips without any risk of getting caught. The
stakes were considerable as the maximum possible payo in this task corresponds roughly
to half the amount students of similar age receive in pocket money every week (e.g., see
8The two cognitive ability tests are based on submodules of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS), one of the most frequently used intelligence tests.
9Test scores are positively correlated in our sample (Spearman's rho = 0:423; p < 0:001).
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www.budgetberatung.ch). After completing the coin tossing task, subjects were asked
to put their envelope with the remaining coins into a container.
Teachers were asked to assess their students along three dimensions: disruptiveness
in class, non-completion of homework, and absenteeism. For each item the teachers
evaluated the students on a scale from never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves
(= 6). These measures of school misbehavior were inspired by the US National Educa-
tional Longitudinal Surveya study that followed a nationally representative sample of
more than 20,000 students over several years. We chose these measures of school misb-
heavior as they have been shown to reliably predict future educational achievement and
labor market outcomes (Segal 2013). Because the three items are strongly correlated
(Cronbach's  = 0:718) we created an index of school misbehavior using the unweighted
average of all three items. Our regression analysis uses the school misbehavior index
to reduce the inuence of measurement error, but we also report the results using the
three measures of misbehavior separately. We matched teachers' evaluations with the
experimental data using identication codes to preserve subjects' anonymity.
3 Results
The results indicate that a signicant proportion of the subjects cheated by inating
their number of successful coin tosses. Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution
of reported heads is shifted towards a higher number of heads relative to the honest
benchmark provided by the binomial distribution. The outcomes ten, nine, and eight
times heads are signicantly over-represented (p < 0:001 for all three outcomes, binomial
tests), whereas the outcomes two, three, four, and ve times heads are signicantly
underreported (p = 0:011, p < 0:001, p = 0:032, and p = 0:055, binomial tests). On
average, the students reported heads for 62.8% of the coin ips (95% condence interval:
60.0%, 65.7%). Assuming that none of the participants cheated to his or her disadvantage
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we estimate that 25.7% of the coin ips were misreported.10
Figure 1: Students' behavior in the coin tossing task
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The gure indicates that a signicant proportion of students cheated in the coin tossing task. The
empirical distribution of reported heads (green) is shifted towards higher numbers of headsi.e., higher
earningsrelative to the binomial distribution implied by fully honest reporting (blue).
We also analyzed individual determinants of cheating using multivariate regression
analysis. Column (1) of Table 1 indicates that female students behaved more honestly
than male students as they reported heads signicantly less often (p < 0:000, t-test).11
Moreover, we found that high school students cheated signicantly less than those from
middle school after controlling for age (p = 0:011, t-test), which could be explained by
less deviant students selecting into higher education. However, cheating is not related to
measures of cognitive ability, neither to crystallized nor to uid intelligence (p = 0:599
and p = 0:744, t-tests).
10The calculation of percentage of misreported coin tosses is straightforward if we assume that none of
the participants cheated to his or her disadvantage (see Houser et al. 2012). Let h be the percentage of
heads reported andm be the percentage of misreported coin tosses. For any given coin toss, a participant
who cheats reports heads with a probability of 1. By contrast, a participant who is truthful reports heads
with a probability of 0.5. Thus, the percentage of heads reported is h = m1+(1 m)0:5 = 0:5(1+m).
Solving the equation yields the percentage of misreported coin tosses m = 2  h  1.
11Dreber and Johannesson (2008) document a similar gender dierence in dishonest behavior.
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Table 1: Determinants of Cheating and School Misbehavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable # of heads School Misbehavior Index
# of heads 0.150 0.145
(0.023) (0.022)
Age -0.038 0.489 0.472 0.467
(0.731) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Female -1.061 -0.621 -0.663 -0.817
(0.000) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Swiss -0.411 0.143 0.186 0.127
(0.140) (0.224) (0.192) (0.422)
High school -1.018 -1.360 -1.033 -1.181
(0.050) (0.005) (0.031) (0.020)
Parental education -0.120 0.462 0.532 0.514
(0.657) (0.168) (0.138) (0.136)
Crystallized intelligence -0.080 -0.267 -0.279
(0.599) (0.041) (0.037)
Fluid intelligence -0.041 0.040 0.034
(0.744) (0.788) (0.827)
Constant 8.145 -6.321 -6.239 -5.056
(0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R2 0.226 0.310 0.333 0.303
This table reports OLS coecient estimates. P-values are reported in parenthesis. In column (1),
we regress the number of heads reported on a set of individual characteristics and two measures of
cognitive ability. Age is measured in years. Female, Swiss, high school, and parental education are
dummy variables. Parental education equals to one if at least one parent has a university degree. Our
measures of crystallized and uid intelligence are based on the scores from the word uency test and the
symbol-digit correspondence test, respectively. Both cognitive ability measures are normalized to have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In columns 2 to 4, the dependent variable is the school
misbehavior index, which is constructed by averaging the three items of school misconduct, including
disruptiveness in class, failure to complete homework, and absenteeism (all measured on a scale from
never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves (= 6)). Because the models in columns 2 to 4 use
teacher evaluations, we computed p-values that are robust to clustering at the class level. To account
for the low number of clusters we use the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al. 2008) using
the 6-point distribution of weights proposed by Webb (2013). The number of observations is 161 instead
of 162 because one subject did not provide his age. Signicance levels:  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
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We next examined whether our experimental measure of cheating is related to mis-
behavior in school. Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 2 show that behavior in the coin tossing
task is positively associated with all three measures of school misbehavior. Subjects
who reported more than ve times heads score higher by 0.5 points (or 72 percent) on
disruptiveness in class, 0.9 points (or 69 percent) on non-completion of homework, and
0.4 points (or 61 percent) on absenteeism relative to the others. In the raw data, the
correlations are statistically signicant for disruptiveness and homework (p = 0:003 and
p = 0:020), but absenteeism fails to reach statistical signicance (p = 0:136, Spearman
tests).
Figure 2: Cheating and School Misbehavior
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The gure shows that, relative to those who reported ve times heads or less, students who reported
more than ve times heads disrupt the class to a larger degree (a), fail to do their homework more often
(b), and are more frequently absent from school (c). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean
(adjusted for clustering at the class level).
We additionally estimated regression models to control for factors that might jointly
inuence cheating and school misbehavior. In the regression analysis, we use the school
misbehavior index, which is the average score of all three individual measures of school
misbehavior. Our main results are similar if we analyze each measure of school misbe-
havior separately.12
Column (2) of Table 1 conrms that behavior in the coin tossing task is signicantly
12The results are available from the authors upon request.
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related to school misbehavior when controlling for age, gender, nationality, education
level, and parental education. A higher number of heads reported is associated with
increased behavioral problems in school (p = 0:022, t-test). Interestingly, in addition
to being more honest, female and high school students also misbehave less frequently
(p = 0:030 and p < 0:001, respectively, t-tests). The model reported in column (3)
additionally includes our measures of cognitive ability as control variables. Crystallized
intelligence is negatively associated with school misbehavior (p = 0:033, t-test), but uid
intelligence is not (p = 0:780, t-test). While dierences in cognitive ability explain some
variation in disruptive and noncompliant behavior, the predictive power of the coin
tossing task for school misbehavior remains high after controlling for key background
characteristics as well as cognitive ability (p = 0:024, t-test). For comparison, the
dierence in school misbehavior between a student who reported 10 times heads and a
student who reported 5 times heads is about the same as between two students with
a (crystallized) intelligence gap of 2.7 standard deviations. The dierence in school
misbehavior between presumable cheaters and honest students is also larger than the
widely discussed gender gap in misbehavior (e.g., Bertrand and Pan 2013). In column
(4) of Table 1 we removed our laboratory measure of cheating from the regression model
and found that the gender coecient increases from -0.663 to -0.817. This suggest that
gender dierences in experimentally elicited rule violating behavior explains almost one-
fth of the gender gap in school misbehavior.13
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined whether a common laboratory measure of cheating is a
reliable indicator of rule violating behavior in the eld. We present evidence on the
link between rule violating behavior in the lab and eld using middle and high school
13We found very similar results using the pooled Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methoda technique
that was initially developed for studying the gender gap in labor market earnings (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca
1973).
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students. We combined experimental data from an incentivized coin tossing task with
measures of disruptive and noncompliant behavior at school. Our main result is that
students who cheated more in the coin tossing task also misbehave more often at school.
The relationship holds when controlling for students' socioeconomic background and
cognitive ability.
From a methodological view, our ndings contribute to the active debate about the
generalizability of laboratory experiments, i.e., whether data obtained in the lab can
be extrapolated to naturally occurring environments (Levitt and List 2007; Falk and
Heckman 2009). We found a strong relationship between lab and eld measures of
rule violating behavior despite obvious dierences across the two settings, including the
context of the choice situation and the degree of scrutinyfactors which have been argued
to make inferences from lab to eld environments dicult. Our ndings are particularly
reassuring for the usefulness of laboratory methods given that behavior in the cheating
paradigm has been conjectured to be more context-sensitive than other experimental
measures of behavior, such as cooperativeness and consumption choices (Abeler et al.
2014).
Given the profound and long-term consequences of misbehavior in school (e.g., Segal
2013), the fact that a simple experimental measure of cheating is able to predict a
variety of school misconduct has also clear implications for policymakers. In particular,
our ndings provide a proof of concept that policymakers can successfully identify at-
risk school children early on in development, precisely at the point in childhood when
targeted interventions are most likely to be eective (e.g., Heckman 2006). Thus, a
deeper investigation of the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms tied to rule
violating behavior will likely provide fruitful insights into the development of targeted
interventions aimed to reduce delinquent classroom behavior.
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